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1 Introduction
Embezzlement, defined as the misappropriation of assets by individuals to whom they were
entrusted in order to monopolize or to steal them, is widespread all around the world. It
can be observed in any situation in which the providers of resources need intermediaries
to transfer these resources to the final recipients. The problem is particularly important
in developing countries, in various domains such as health,1 education,2 or humanitarian
aid,3 where the final recipients seldom receive the totality of governmental or international
aid transfers they are entitled to. In these countries, governmental and non-governmental
organizations must rely on local intermediaries and cannot easily verify which amount
has eventually been transferred to the entitled recipients. It is a major concern since
embezzlement is detrimental to economic development (Olken and Pande, 2012). Once
the costs of embezzlement are accounted for, some programs may even be inequality
enhancing (e.g., Reinikka and Svensson, 2014) or no longer cost-effective (e.g., Ferraz et
al., 2012).
Exploring the determinants of the intermediaries’ behavior in this context is crucial to
design policies that are better able to deter this type of fraud. So far, the literature has
focused mainly on the monetary determinants of embezzlement in line with the traditional
1In Cambodia, in 2005, 5% to 10% of the Health budget “disappeared” before it was paid from
the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Health (Gaitonde et al., 2016). In Ghana, in 2000, the
Public Expenditure Tracking Survey revealed that 80% of non-salary funds did not reach health facilities
(Canagarajah and Ye, 2001).
2For the period 1991-1995, Ugandan schools received on average 13% of the governmental transfers
they were entitled to (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004). Ferraz et al. (2012) report at least 26 cases
of embezzlement of decentralized educational grants in Brazil. In the municipality of Placas, between
2003 and 2004, US$ 1.25 millions of decentralized public educational grants could not be accounted for.
Embezzlement even extended to stealing teacher’s wages: in Itabuna, in May 2009, approximately 90%
of municipal school teachers, received less than half of their monthly salaries.
3In 2013, the head of the governmental High Relief Committee was arrested for the misappropriation
of US$ 10 million earmarked for the aid of refugees in Lebanon. In India, in 2005, government and bank
officials were charged with embezzling US$ 2.5 millions in state funds designated for flood relief efforts.
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economics-of-crime approach (e.g., Becker and Stigler, 1974; Fanet al., 2009). This has led
to explore policy instruments such as increasing the officers’ wages or the audit intensity
(e.g., Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2003; Olken, 2007; Barr et al., 2009). But like other
forms of dishonesty (e.g., Mazar et al., 2008; Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi, 2013; Abeler
et al., 2018), embezzlement and corruption also entail moral costs (e.g., Abbink and Serra,
2012; Drugov et al., 2014) that may not be sensitive to these interventions.
In this paper we focus on the psychological cost of embezzling, by studying the inter-
mediary’s willingness to avoid the anticipated negative valence associated with guilt from
embezzlement. Guilt aversion implies that an agent suffers a cost, i.e., feels guilty, if he
lets down others’ expectations (Tangney and Fischer, 1995). Theoretically, we rely on the
modeling of guilt aversion as a belief-dependent motivation by Charness and Dufwenberg
(2006) and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (BD, hereafter) (2007) in the framework of psy-
chological game theory introduced by Geanakoplos et al. (1989) and further developed
by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009). This theory departs from traditional game theory
in assuming that players’ utilities do not only depend on their actions but also on their
beliefs about choices, beliefs, or information. In particular, the psychological utility of
a guilt-averse player depends on his second-order beliefs, i.e., his beliefs about the other
players’ beliefs about his own decision.
Our aim is to identify the existence and the direction of guilt aversion and its impact
on the behavior of intermediaries who have the opportunity to embezzle the donations
made by donors to recipients. While embezzling donations increases the intermediaries’
monetary payoff, it decreases both the utility of donors who care about the recipients’
wellbeing and the utility of the recipients who expect to receive a donation. As a re-
sult, intermediaries who embezzle may feel guilty both toward the donor and toward the
recipient. Indirect evidence of intermediaries’ guilt aversion can be found in previous
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experimental studies of embezzlement. Chlaß et al. (2015) found that the more donors
believe that the donation will be transferred, the more they donate, and the more inter-
mediaries believe that donors have donated, the more they transfer. 4 This two-fold result
is consistent with our model of guilt aversion which predicts that the more donors believe
the donation will be transferred, the more intermediaries transfer. Meanwhile, conducting
a lab-in-the-field experiment in Tanzania, Di Falco et al. (2016) have shown that interme-
diaries at the beginning of longer chains embezzle less than intermediaries in short chains,
anticipating that other intermediaries after them may embezzle as well. Feeling guilty
from letting down the recipients’ expectation might explain the intermediaries’ behaviour
in their experiment. Interestingly, the idea that guilt aversion is a relevant motivation in
the context of corruption was also developed by Balafoutas (2011). The author provides a
dynamic model where a guilt-averse official may feel guilty toward a citizen if he accepts
the bribe offered by a lobby. Our contribution goes one step further by providing an
experimental test of guilt-aversion as a determinant of corrupt behaviour.
Specifically, we model the intermediary’s guilt aversion both toward the donor and the
recipient and further test whether one direction matters more than the other. By doing
so, we contribute both to the theoretical extension of BD (2007) model of guilt aversion
and to the empirical identification of determinants of the embezzlement decision. If we
find a difference between guilt aversion vis-a`-vis the donor and vis-a`-vis the recipient, it
may also suggest different policy interventions.
We apply BD (2007) model of simple guilt to a novel three-player game – the Em-
bezzlement Mini-Game. In this game, a donor sends a donation to a recipient but it has
to be transferred by an intermediary who can embezzle a fraction of the donation. The
4We reckon that the intermediaries’ behaviour may be driven by the fact that reporting beliefs after
deciding allows the more dishonest intermediaries to justify their deed. We control for this bias by
inducing second-order beliefs rather than relying on reported beliefs.
4
intermediary may be affected by two sources of guilt aversion: donor-guilt aversion and
recipient-guilt aversion. The donor entrusts him with a donation and forms expectations
on his willingness to transfer the whole donation to the recipient.5 The recipient also has
expectations on how much he will receive. Depending on his decision, the intermediary
can fulfill (or not) the other two players’ expectations. Hence, he may be guilt-averse
both toward the donor and toward the recipient.
For recipient-guilt, we rely on BD’s definition of guilt toward another player as the
disutility from letting down the other player’s expectations about his own payoff. For
donor-guilt, we extend this definition of guilt. Rather than not letting down the donor’s
expectations about his own payoff – which is not affected by the intermediary’s decision
to embezzle –, a donor-guilt averse intermediary dislikes letting down the donor’s expec-
tations about another player ’s monetary payoff, i.e., the recipient. Thus, in this case, the
psychological utility of the guilt-averse player (the intermediary) directly depends on his
beliefs about another player’s belief (the donor) on athird player’s actual monetary payoff
(the recipient).6 To the best of our knowledge, the latter modelling choice is new in the
psy-games literature.7
Our theoretical analysis builds on the incomplete-information environment with role-
dependent guilt of Attanasi et al. (2016). We assume that among the two active players
in the embezzlement game only the intermediary can feel guilty and we allow for bi-
dimensional guilt. However, unlike in Attanasi et al. (2016), we use rationalizability
5“Ensuring that a reasonable proportion of donations get to end cause” is the most important quality
of a charity according to survey conducted in Wales and England (Ipsos MORI, 2010).
6Indeed, this extension relies on the auxiliary assumption that the recipient’s payoff enters the utility
of an altruistic donor and the intermediaries can infer that the donor is altruistic in this sense.
7In Balafoutas (2011), an extension of his model also allows for the official to feel guilty toward both
the citizen and the lobby. However, both citizen-guilt and lobby-guilt are coherent with BD’s original of
model since the official can affect the payoff of both the citizen and the lobby.
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rather than Bayesian equilibrium as a solution concept.8 We apply the forward-induction
rationalizability analysis elaborated by Attanasi et al. (2013) for Trust Mini-games. How-
ever, our analysis is complicated by the fact that the donor’s sensitivity to altruism is
unknown to the intermediary whereas, in Attanasi et al. (2013), the trustor is commonly
known to be selfish.
We tested the predictions of our model by implementing our Embezzlement Mini-Game
in a laboratory experiment that allows us to measure directly the role of second-order be-
liefs on the intermediaries’ decision to embezzle donations, adapting the belief-dependent
menu method of Khalmetski et al. (2015). Within-subjects, we manipulated the per-
centage of the donation that could be embezzled: 80% in the High condition and 60%
in the Low condition. Between-subjects, we manipulated the information given to the
intermediaries before they made their decision. In the Donor treatment, intermediaries
decided whether transferring or not the whole donation for each possible first-order belief
of the donor on their decision. In the Recipient treatment, they made a decision for each
possible first-order belief of the recipient on their decision. We can therefore compare the
intermediaries’ donor-guilt aversion and recipient-guilt aversion. We also elicited the indi-
vidual sensitivity to guilt by using the Guilt and Shame Proneness (GASP) questionnaire
of Cohen et al. (2011).
We have two main findings. First, we show that, on average, 25% of the intermediaries
are guilt-averse, i.e., their decision to embezzle is influenced by others’ expectations, and
this holds regardless of the direction of the guilt. Second, structural estimates indicate
that guilt sensitivity is higher toward the recipients’ expectations than toward the donors’
expectations. Taken together, these results suggest that to discourage embezzlement,
8Using rationalizability is motivated by the fact that a standard equilibrium analysis has no com-
pelling foundation for games played one-shot (like ours) and in general in experiments on other-regarding
preferences.
6
policy interventions can try to increase the anticipation of guilt among intermediaries by
disseminating information on others’ expectations toward them, both the expectations of
the donors and those of the recipients.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical
model and its behavioral predictions. We describe the experimental design in Section 3.1.
Section 4 presents the experimental results. Section 5 discusses and concludes.
2 Theoretical Model and Behavioral Hypotheses
2.1 The Embezzlement Mini-Game(s)
The Embezzlement Mini-Game involves three players: a donor, an intermediary and a
recipient (see Figure 1). Players’ material payoffs in Figure 1 are shown according to such
order.
The three players receive an initial endowment: 150 ECU (Experimental Currency
Units) for the donor, 80 ECU for the intermediary, and 10 ECU for the recipient (with 10
ECU = e1.2 in the experiment). Thus, the intermediary’s endowment is median between
the donor’s and the recipient’s endowments.9
The donor can keep his endowment (in which case the game ends and each player
earns his endowment) or give 25 ECU to the recipient. However, the donation cannot
be given directly to the recipient, it has to be transferred through the intermediary. The
intermediary has to decide whether to transfer the entirety of the donation to the recipient
or to embezzle a fraction f of the 25 ECU and transfer (1–f ) to the recipient. The recipient
9The intermediary can be seen as the middleman in a network linking a NGO or a Governmental
Agency to villagers. Unlike in a consecutive three-person dictator game (Bahr and Requate, 2013), the
different initial endowments underline the different status of each player.
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Figure 1: The Embezzlement Mini-Game(s)
receives twice the amount actually transferred. Thus, embezzlement involves an efficiency
loss.10
Using a within-subject design, the Mini-Game is played under two conditions, each
one allowing the intermediary to embezzle a different fraction of the donation: in the Low
condition, f = 0.6, and in the High condition, f = 0.8. Therefore, the two Mini-Games
only differ for the set of possible actions of the intermediary (respectively, f ∈ {0, 0.6}
and f ∈ {0, 0.8}), both being a strict subset of the possible actions in the original game,
where f ∈ [0, 1].
Figure 1 also shows two features of the final payoff distributions under each of these
two conditions. First, no decision can lead to the equalization of payoffs between two or
10This feature (also used in Boly et al., 2016) captures a negative externality associated with embez-
zlement (see Ferraz et al., 2012, for an illustration in the domain of education in Brazil). The presence
of a negative externality also reinforces the immoral image of embezzlement.
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three players. Hence, no payoff distribution should be more salient than others. Second,
the ranking of payoffs cannot be affected by the players’ decisions. By doing so, we limit
social comparison motives.
2.2 Utility Functions
2.2.1 Assumptions about Social Preferences
We assume that the donor can be motivated by distributional preferences – altruism
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002), and
the intermediary can be motivated by belief-dependent preferences – guilt aversion a` la
BD (2007).
We assume that the donor’s utility increases with the recipient’s payoff while it is unaf-
fected by the intermediary’s payoff. This is a simplifying assumption but it is broadly con-
sistent with other models of distributional preferences. Donors would also prefer that their
donation increases the recipient’s payoff rather the intermediary’s if they were inequality-
averse (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), since the recipient is the
most disadvantaged player; and if they were concerned with efficiency (as in Charness
and Rabin, 2002) since social welfare is maximum if the entire donation is transferred to
the recipient. Our experimental design allows us to test this assumption: we elicit the
donor’s first-order belief that the intermediary will choose Transfer after Give. If the
donor’s utility increases with the recipient’s payoff about the recipient, we should find
that the probability of giving increases in the donor’s first-order belief about Transfer
after Give.
We also assume that the intermediary can feel guilty toward both the recipient and the
donor : he might want not to disappoint the recipient’s and/or the donor’s expectations
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about the amount he will actually transfer conditionally on the donor’s giving. In our
model, we analyze the impact of each guilt sensitivity (toward the donor and toward the
recipient) separately, since we used a between-subject design to elicit the intermediary’s
belief-dependent strategy conditional on either the donor’s (Donor treatment) or the re-
cipient’s (Recipient treatment) first-order beliefs (see Section 3.1). Therefore, we make
the auxiliary assumption that in the Donor (Recipient) treatment, guilt toward the donor
(the recipient) prevails over guilt toward the recipient (the donor) as belief-dependent
motivation of the intermediary’s behavior.
We analyze the Embezzlement Game under incomplete information of players’ social
preferences, i.e., we assume that the donor’s sensitivity to altrusim toward the recipient,
and the intermediary’s sensitivities to guilt toward either the donor or the recipient, are
not common knowledge. Although this yields weaker predictions than under complete
information, we believe that this condition better fits the environment of our experiment,
where, as in the overwhelming majority of other laboratory studies on belief-dependent
preferences, sensitivities to such preferences are not disclosed within the matched subjects
in the game (for an exception, see Attanasi et al. (2013, 2018)).
2.2.2 The Donor’s Utility Function
The donor’s utility function is composed of two parts (Eq. 1).
MD(sD) is the donor’s material payoff. It only depends on his strategy sD ∈ {Keep,Give}.
In the case he keeps, his material payoff coincides with his endowment. In the case he
gives, the endowment is reduced by the amount given.
AD(γD, sI) represents the donor’s altruism toward the recipient, i.e., his preferences
toward an increase in the recipient’s material payoff. It is the product of two terms:
(i) γD ≥ 0, the donor’s willingness-to-pay to increase the recipient’s payoff by 2 (since
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every ECU transferred to the recipient is doubled): it is an exogenous parameter that
describes the donor’s type in terms of sensitivity to altruism toward the recipient; (ii)
r(sI), how much the recipient eventually receives: it depends on sI , the intermediary’s
strategy conditional on the donor choosing Give.
In fact, the donor’s altruism toward the recipient enters his utility function only if he
chooses Give, i.e., sD = G. In that case, the donor’s actual altruism toward the recipient
depends on the intermediary’s action. We denote with αDI the donor’s first-order belief
that the intermediary chooses Transfer, conditional on the donor choosing Give. With
this, the utility (Eq. 1) and expected utility (Eq. 2) of the donor go as follows:
UD(sD, sI , γD) = MD(sD) + 1sD=G ·AD(γD, sI), with AD(γD, sI) = γD · r(sI) (1)
ED[UD(sD, αDI , γD)] = MD(sD) + 1sD=G · γD · (αDI · r(T ) + (1− αDI) · r(E)) (2)
We assume that the donor’s sensitivity to altruism, γD, can take two values. Either the
donor is selfish, γD = 0, or he is altruistic, γ¯D > 1/2. The motivation for the specific
threshold of 1/2 for an altruistic donor will be provided in Section 2.3.1, when discussing
the rational behavior of an altruistic donor.
2.2.3 The Recipient’s Utility Function
The recipient’s utility function coincides with his material payoff (Eq. 3). The material
payoff is made of two parts: (i) MR is the recipient’s endowment, that he holds indepen-
dently of the donor’s and intermediary’s choices ; (ii) MR(sD, sI) is the part that depends
on the donor’s and the intermediary’s strategies. It enters the recipient’s utility function
only if the donor chooses Give, i.e., sD = G. In that case, it depends on the intermedi-
ary’s strategy: MR(sD, sI) = r(sI), i.e., the amount actually received, that we also used
to measure the donor’s altruism in Eq. (2). With this, the utility function of the recipient
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is:
UR(sD, sI) = MR + 1sD=G · r(sI) (3)
We are interested in the recipient’s beliefs only in terms of their psychological impact
on the intermediary’s choice. Thus, in the experiment we only elicited αRI , namely
the recipient’s first-order belief that the intermediary chooses Transfer, conditional on
the donor choosing Give (and not the recipient’s belief about the donor choosing Give).
Hence, we only focus on the recipient’s expected utility after the donor has made his
choice:
ER[UR(sD, αRI)] = MR + 1sD=G · (αRI · r(T ) + (1− αRI) · r(E)) (4)
2.2.4 The Intermediary’s Utility Function
The intermediary’s utility function is composed of three parts (Eq. 5). The first part
corresponds to his material payoff, MI(sD, sI). It depends on both the donor’s and his
own strategy. If sD = G, it depends on his own action, otherwise it coincides with his
endowment.
The second part, GID, corresponds to the intermediary’s feeling of guilt toward the
donor. It is the product of two terms: (i) θID ≥ 0, the guilt sensitivity toward the
donor; (ii) the difference, if positive, between the donor’s expected transfer ED[r(αDI)]
and the realized transfer r(sI) to the recipient. Thus, (i) is an exogenous parameter that
describes the intermediary’s type, while (ii) depends both on the intermediary’s strategy,
and on the donor’s conditional first-order belief about this strategy. If ED[r(αDI)] > r(sI),
the intermediary feels guilty from letting down the donor’s expectations on the amount
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transferred by the recipient.
The third part, GIR, captures the intermediary’s feeling of guilt toward the recipient.
It is formed similarly as for GID as the product of (i) θIR ≥ 0, the guilt sensitivity toward
the recipient, and (ii) the difference, if positive, between the recipient’s expected transfer
ER[r(αRI)] and the realized transfer r(sI).
Thus, the intermediary’s psychological utility is defined as:
UI(sD, sI , θID, θIR, αDI , αRI) = MI(sD, sI)−GID(sI , θID, αDI)−GIR(sI , θIR, αRI)
where GID = θID ·max{0,ED[r(αDI ]− r(sI)} (5)
and GIR = θIR ·max{0,ER[r(αRI)]− r(sI)}
If sD = K (the donor keeps), then ED[r(αDI)] = ER[r(αRI)] = 0 and the intermediary
cannot feel guilty. It does not feel guilty also if (sD, sI) = (G, T ), i.e., the donor gives
and the intermediary transfers the whole donation to the recipient.
We assume that there are only two psychological types for the intermediary, given the
specific source of guilt. Thus, with regard to the donor, we assume that the intermediary
can be either donor-selfish, θID = 0, or donor-guilt-averse, θ¯ID > 1/2. As for the recipient,
he can be either recipient-selfish, θIR = 0, or recipient-guilt-averse, θ¯IR > 1/2. The
motivation for the specific threshold of 1/2 for a guilt-averse intermediary will be provided
in Section 2.3.2, when discussing the rationalizability of a guilt-averse intermediary’s
behavior.
Two clarifications are in order about Equation (5). First, in Equation (5) we measure
the intermediary’s guilt aversion through the co-players’ first-order rather than with the
intermediary’s second-order beliefs about Transfer choices. Given our design (see section
3.1), when the intermediary takes his decision, the donor’s and the recipient’s beliefs
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are observed, hence the intermediary’s second-order belief corresponds to the donor’s or
recipient’s first-order belief.11
Second, as anticipated, although donor-guilt aversion and recipient-guilt aversion ap-
pear simultaneously in Equation (5), we will analyze the intermediary’s behavior sepa-
rately for GID and GIR, under the assumption that θIR = 0 (θID = 0) in the Donor
treatment (Recipient treatment).12
2.3 Rationalizability with Forward Induction
We provide a rationalizability analysis of the Embezzlement Mini-Game(s) with incom-
plete information based on forward-induction reasoning (cf. BD, 2009, Section 5; Bat-
tigalli et al., 2017). Under incomplete information, both the psychological type of the
donor (γD) and the psychological type of the intermediary (θID or θIR) are not common
knowledge, while the recipient is commonly known to be selfish.13
The first two steps of our analysis are based on the following assumptions:
Step 1. Rationality: each player is rational, i.e., a subjective expected utility maximizer.
Step 2. Strong belief in rationality: each player is certain of the rationality of the co-
player as long as such rationality is not contradicted by observed behavior.
11BD (2009) have shown the equivalence of the analysis in terms of other’s first-order or own second-
order beliefs in dynamic psychological games.
12This is without loss of generality, especially under our rationalizability approach: we are not interested
in equilibrium thresholds of θID and θIR, but only on the correlation between these guilt sensitivities
and the intermediary’s behavior, and both guilt components push the intermediary in the direction of
Transfer over Embezzle for positive co-player’s beliefs. Moreover, analyzing the two cases separately
allows us to provide sharper predictions in each of the two treatments, which is the main motivation
behind our between-subject design.
13See Appendix A for a presentation of the Harsanyi-type structure behind our incomplete-information
game. There we also discuss the main methodological advantages of the two-step rationalizability proce-
dure that we use to elaborate behavioral predictions in the incomplete-information game.
14
The second assumption is the basic forward-induction reasoning (see Battigalli
and Siniscalchi, 2002; BD, 2009).
2.3.1 Rationality of the Donor
We perform the first step of rationalizability (best-reply analysis) of the donor’s behavior
in the two conditions of our embezzlement game, namely L (Low) and H (High). Relying
on Eq. (2), we define the donor’s Willingness-to-Give function (WG) as the difference
between his expected utility from Give and his (certain) utility from Keep (Eq. 6).
WG(αDI , γD) = ED[UD(G,αDI , γD]− UD(K, γD)
= MD(G) + γD · (αDI · r(T ) + (1− αDI) · r(E))−MD(K) (6)
Recall that we have assumed that the donor’s set of utility types is made of only two
elements, i.e., γD = {0, γ¯D}, with γ¯D > 1/2. The rationality of a selfish donor leads to a
negative Willingness-to-Give function in both the Low and the High conditions:
WGk(αDI , 0) = −25, with k = L,H
The rationality of an altruistic donor leads to the following Give thresholds for γ¯D:
WGL(αDI , γD) = −25 + γ¯D · (αDI · 30 + 20) > 0 ⇐⇒ γ¯D > 5
6αDI + 4
(7)
WGH(αDI , γD) = −25 + γ¯D · (αDI · 40 + 10) > 0 ⇐⇒ γ¯D > 5
8αDI + 2
(8)
These inequalities justify our assumption of γ¯D > 1/2 for an altruistic donor. Consider
the situation where an altruistic donor is paired with an intermediary believed to Transfer
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(i.e., αDI = 1). On the one hand, if γ¯D = 1/2, an altruistic donor would be indifferent
between Give or Keep and, if γ¯D < 1/2, an altruistic donor would behave as a selfish one.
On the other hand, if γ¯D > 1/2, an altruistic donor would Give absent the intermediary,
i.e., he would be altruistic in the strategically equivalent Dictator game.
Recall that in our experiment the set of possible first-order beliefs of the donor is
discrete: αDI ∈ {0, 1/3, 2/3, 1}. Substituting these values into Eqs. (7) and (8), we find
the set of ‘belief – type’ pairs consistent with a rational donor choosing Give in the Low
and High conditions, respectively (Step 1):
R
1,G|L
D = {(αDI , γ¯D) : (αDI = 0, γ¯D > 5/4), (αDI = 1/3, γ¯D > 1),
(αDI = 2/3, γ¯D > 5/8), (αDI = 1, γ¯D > 1/2)}
R
1,G|H
D = {(αDI , γ¯D) : (αDI = 0, γ¯D > 5/2), (αDI = 1/3, γ¯D > 15/14),
(αDI = 2/3, γ¯D > 15/22), (αDI = 1, γ¯D > 1/2)}
(9)
Now, fix the donor’s type γ¯D and consider the (rationality) requirement that action
Give maximizes the donor’s expected utility in the Low condition (R
1,G|L
D ). If γ¯D ∈
(1/2, 5/8), this donor’s type will Give only for αDI = 1; if γ¯D ∈ (5/8, 1), he will also Give
for αDI = 2/3; if γ¯D ∈ (1, 5/4), he will also Give for αDI = 1/3; if γ¯D ∈ (5/4,+∞), he will
Give for every αDI . Therefore, independently from γ¯D, ∂WG
k/∂αDI ≥ 0 for k = L,H.
Thus, considering heterogeneity in donors’ types (sensitivity to altruism), we expect the
frequency of Give choices to increase with αDI . A similar prediction can be elaborated
for the High condition. All this leads to our first behavioral prediction about the donor’s
belief-dependent behavior.
H.D1 [Choice-Belief Correlation]: The frequency of Give choices by altruistic donors
increases in their first-order belief about Transfer.
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Note that is H.D1 is not verified, it contradicts our assumption that the donor’s utility
increases with the recipient’s payoff while it is unaffected by the intermediary’s payoff.
Furthermore, consider the comparison between the Willingness-to-Give function of an
altruistic donor in the two conditions:
WGL(αDI , γ¯D)−WGH(αDI , γ¯D) = 5 + γ¯D · 10 · αDI
We see that, given that γ¯D > 1/2, then WG
L −WGH > 0 for αDI < 1. Note that we
can assume that the distribution of the donors’ types is the same across conditions since
conditions are manipulated within-subjects. Therefore, we can construct the set of ‘belief
– type’ pairs consistent with a rational donor choosing Keep in the Low condition and Give
in the High condition, (R
1,K|L
D ∩R1,G|HD ) = ∅, and the set consistent with a rational donor
choosing Give in the Low condition and Keep in the High condition, (R
1,G|L
D ∩R1,K|HD ) =
{(αDI = 0, 5/4 < γ¯D < 5/2), (αDI = 1/3, 1 < γ¯D < 15/14), (αDI = 2/3, 5/8 < γ¯D <
15/22)}. The following behavioral hypothesis summarizes this prediction.
H.D2 [High vs. Low Condition on Choice]: The frequency of Give choices by altruistic
donors is higher in the Low than in the High condition for each donor’s first-order belief
lower than one.
Note that H.D1 and H.D2 should hold in both the Donor and the Recipient treatment.
2.3.2 Rationality and Forward Induction of the Intermediary
We analyze the intermediary’s behavior in the Donor treatment and the Recipient treat-
ment separately, assuming θIR = 0 in the former and θID = 0 in the latter. We begin
with the Donor treatment, since it is the more interesting due to the above mentioned
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extension of BD (2007) in the definition of donor-guilt aversion.
Relying on Eq. (5), we define the intermediary’s Willingness-to-Transfer function
(WT) – conditional on Give14 – as the difference between his utility when he Transfers
(thereby experiencing no guilt) and his expected utility when he Embezzles a fraction of
the donation (Eq. 10).
WT (αDI , θID|G) = EI [UI(αDI , θID)|G,T ]− EI [UI(αDI , θID)|G,E] (10)
= MI(G,T )−MI(G,E) + θID(αDI · r(T ) + (1− αDI) · r(E))− r(E))
The analysis in each condition depends on the shape of WT (αDI , θID|G) implied by
the intermediary’s psychological type θID. Rationality implies that the intermediary of
type θID chooses the dominant action when it exists. This gives the step-1 prediction set
R1I .
In the second step, it is assumed that the intermediary strongly believes in the donor’s
rationality. Therefore, after having observed Give, the intermediary can infer the altru-
istic type of the donor, i.e., γD = γ¯D independently from the donor’s first-order be-
lief of Transfer (Give is never a best reply for a selfish donor); formally, PI (R1D|G) =
PI (γ˜D = γ¯D|G) = 1. Thus, the intermediary believes that the donor’s Willingness-to-
Give function is represented by (Eq. 10) i.e.), that the donor’s utility increases with
r(sI). With this, a ‘choice – type’ pair (sI , θID) is consistent with the intermediary’s
rationality and strong belief in the donor’s rationality if and only if there is some αDI
14The intermediary’s decision is made under the strategy method (i.e., both when the donor has chosen
Keep and when he has chosen Give). Here we assume that the intermediary best-responds as if he had
truly observed the donor’s move. This holds by standard expected-utility maximization, except for the
cases where the intermediary is certain that the donor has chosen Keep. Thus, we need the additional
assumption that the intermediary has a belief conditional on Give, even if he is certain of Keep.
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such that WT (αDI , θID|G) > 0. Let
R2,TI =
{
(sI , θID) : max
αDI∈{0, 13 , 23 ,1}
WT (αDI , θID|G) > 0, sI = T
}
and
R2,EI =
{
(sI , θID) : max
αDI∈{0, 13 , 23 ,1}
WT (αDI , θID|G) < 0, sI = E
}
then the second step of rationalizability leads to R2I = R
2,T
I ∪R2,EI . Transfer (respectively,
Embezzle) is forward-induction dominant for θDI if and only if WT (αDI , θID|G) > 0
(respectively WT (αDI , θID|G) < 0) for every αDI ∈ {0, 13 , 23 , 1}.
For a donor-selfish intermediary (θID = 0), the Willingness-to-Transfer function (Eq.
10) is negative, independently from both the first-order belief of Transfer and the condi-
tion, i.e., a donor-selfish intermediary will always choose Embezzle in both the Low and
the High condition.
For a donor-guilt-averse intermediary (θID = θ¯ID > 1/2), the Willingness-to-Transfer
function is positive, independently from the condition, if αID = 1 i.e. a donor-guilt-averse
intermediary will choose to Transfer if (he is certain that) the donor is certain of him
choosing Transfer. This motivates our assumed threshold of θ¯ID > 1/2 for an intermediary
to be guilt-averse.
The donor choosing Give, thereby revealing his type γ¯D > 1/2, induces a restric-
tion on the intermediary’s (second-order) belief of αDI . Consider R
1,G|L
D , the set of
donors’ ‘belief – type’ pairs consistent with rationality in the Low condition (Eq. 9).
If, e.g., γ¯D = 3/4, then the intermediary believes that αDI = {2/3, 1}, i.e., he believes
that the donor has chosen Give believing that at least two over the three intermedi-
aries who can be randomly matched with him would choose Transfer. This leads to
minαDI∈{2/3,1}WT
L(αDI , θID|G) > 0 iff θ¯ID > 3/4, i.e., Transfer is the dominant action
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(and hence rationalizable) iff θID = θ¯ID > 3/4. If instead γ¯D = 9/8 (the donor is more
altruistic), then the intermediary believes that αDI = {1/3, 2/3, 1} (the donor might have
chosen Give also for 1/3), and minαDI∈{1/3,2/3,1}WT
L(αDI , θID|G) > 0 iff θ¯ID > 3/2.
Therefore, R2,TI shrinks if the smallest second-order belief of Transfer consistent with
(rationality and) forward induction decreases. This, coupled with the heterogeneity of
psychological types (the sensitivity to donor-guilt) in the population of intermediaries,
leads to conclude that the frequency of Transfer choices should increase with the inter-
mediary’s assessment of αDI . The same result holds in the High condition. Indeed, given
θID > 0, ∂WT
k/∂αDI ≥ 0 for k = L,H. The following behavioral hypothesis summarizes
our first prediction on the intermediary’s belief-dependent behavior.
H.I1 [Choice-Belief Correlation]: The frequency of Transfer choices by donor-guilt-
averse intermediaries increases in their second-order beliefs about Transfer.
Furthermore, for any αID and θ¯ID, it is WT
H(αDI , θ¯ID|G) = (4/3) ·WTL(αDI , θ¯ID|G).
We can assume that the distribution of the intermediaries’ psychological types is the same
across conditions since conditions are manipulated within-subjects. Therefore, the set of
’belief – choice’ pairs consistent with a rational intermediary, who strongly believes in the
donor’s rationality, choosing Transfer is the same under both conditions (R
2,T |L
I = R
2,T |H
I )
; and the same holds for choosing Embezzle (R
2,E|L
I = R
2,E|H
I ). The following behavioral
hypothesis summarizes the prediction of insensitivity of guilt aversion to the change of
condition.
H.I2 [High vs. Low condition on Choice]: The frequency of Transfer choices by
intermediaries is the same in the Low and in the High conditions.
Finally, consider again the first example given above in the Low condition with an
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induced donor’s altruistic type γ¯D = 3/4, which leads the intermediary believe that αDI =
{2/3, 1}. Consider two types of intermediaries, respectively θ¯ID = 3/5 and θ¯ID = 1. For
type θ¯ID = 3/5, neither Transfer nor Embezzle is forward-induction dominant, since
WTL(αDI , 3/5|G) = −15 + 18 · αDI (if αDI = 2/3 then WTL(2/3, 3/5|G) < 0, while
if αDI = 1 then WT
L(1, 3/5|G) > 0). Thus, his strategy depends on the precise value
of his second-order belief, 2/3 or 1, which rationalizability does not pin down: if θ¯ID
does not belong to either forward-induction dominance region R2,TI or R
2,E
I , then both
strategies can be justified by a second-order belief consistent with the assumption that
the donor is rational. For type θ¯ID = 1, Transfer is dominant, i.e., he will choose
Transfer independently of the second-order belief (which has been induced to be 2/3 or
1). Therefore, for the same induced beliefs, θ¯ID = 3/5 might choose Embezzle while
θ¯ID = 1 will choose Transfer. This can also be interpreted: θ¯ID = 3/5 has a minimum
threshold for second-order beliefs that rationalizes the strategy Transfer that is higher
than that of θ¯ID = 1. All this also holds in the High condition with the same reasoning
as for H.I2. The last behavioral hypothesis summarizes the two predictions above.
H.I3 [Choice-Guilt Correlation]: The higher the intermediary’s donor-guilt-sensitivity,
(i) the higher the frequency of Transfer choices, given his second-order belief about Trans-
fer ; (ii) the lower the minimum second-order belief sufficient to switch from Embezzle to
Transfer.
Since we are not positing any specific assumption concerning the donor’s exogenous
beliefs about θID, we cannot derive any further implication about the donor’s behavior.
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Because the third step does not refine the predictions for the donor, the incomplete-
15To see this, note that if in the Low condition a donor with γ¯D = 1 assigns more than 50% probability
to θID = θ¯ID = 1, then αDI = 1 and the best reply is Give; if, instead, he assigns more than 50%
probability to θID = θID = 0, then αDI = 0 and the best reply is Keep.
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information rationalizability algorithm stops, i.e., it gives the same predictions at each
further step for each player.
Finally, note that the three behavioral hypotheses H.I1, H.I2, and H.I3 also hold in
the Recipient treatment. The analysis in the Recipient treatment is easier since the
recipient is commonly known to be selfish and the Willingness-to-Transfer function can
be directly obtained without using forward induction to induce the recipient’s type. In
fact, at the first step the rationalizability procedure is the same. At the second step, the
Willingness to Transfer function of a recipient-guilt averse intermediary (Eq. 11has
the same functional form as WT (αDI , θID|G) (Eq. 10).
WT (αRI , θIR|G) = EI [UI(αRI , θIR)|G,T ]− EI [UI(αRI , θIR)|G,E] (11)
= MI(G,T )−MI(G,E) + θIR(αRI · r(T ) + (1− αRI) · r(E)− r(E))
This leads us to predict that, under the same distribution of intermediary’s donor-guilt
types θID and recipient-guilt types θIR, intermediaries’ behavior should be the same in
both treatments (between-subjects), as stated by our last behavioral hypothesis.
H.I4 [Donor vs. Recipient treatment on Choice]: Under the same distribution of psy-
chological types, intermediaries’ behavior is the same in both the Donor and the Recipient
treatments.
3 Experimental Design and Procedures
We now describe in details how the game has been implemented in the laboratory.
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3.1 Experimental Design
First-Order Belief Elicitation
In the first part of the experiment, we elicited the players’ first-order beliefs about the
donors’ and the intermediaries’ decisions in the game. Intermediaries and recipients had
to report their beliefs about the number of donors, out of three donors randomly selected
in the session, who choose to donate in the Low and in the High conditions that were
played within-subjects. Similarly, donors and recipients had to report their beliefs about
the number of intermediaries, out of three intermediaries randomly selected in the session,
who choose to transfer the donation in full in each condition (conditional on the donor’s
decision to donate). The belief elicitation was incentivized. For each role, one belief was
randomly selected at the end of the session and paid e1 if accurate.16
Donors’ and Intermediaries’ Decision-Making
In the second part of the experiment, subjects played the Embezzlement Mini-Game. Two
treatments of this game were implemented between-subjects: the Donor treatment and
the Recipient treatment. 17 Within-subjects, donors made a binary choice between giving
a pre-determined fraction of their endowment and keeping their whole endowment, both
in the Low and in the High conditions. These two decisions allow us to test whether the
giving decision varies with the percentage potentially embezzled by the intermediary as
predicted in Hypothesis H.D2.
16This incentivization procedure is the easiest to understand for subjects. Nevertheless, we contend that
it is not perfectly incentive-compatible for risk-averse recipients who may under-estimate the probability
that donors donate and that intermediaries transfer to the recipients. However, this concern is hindered
both in theory – since they are four possible beliefs, one cannot be perfectly insured against risk – and
in practice – we find an insignificant correlation between risk aversion and beliefs (see Table B.6 in
Appendix).
17We used a between-subject design for studying the intermediaries’ donor-guilt aversion and recipient-
guilt aversion because we were anxious that using a within-subject design would be confusing for the
subjects and could have created anchoring effects.
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Meanwhile, intermediaries made binary choices between transferring the entirety of the
amount given by the donor or transferring only a pre-determined fraction of this donation,
both in the Low and in the High conditions. Whether intermediaries started with the
Low or with the High condition was determined randomly at the individual level. These
decisions were made under the veil of ignorance, i.e., assuming that the donor had chosen
to give a positive amount. We used the belief-dependent menu method of Khalmetski et
al. (2015). In each condition, in the Donor (Recipient) treatment, intermediaries made
four transfer decisions corresponding to the four possible first-order beliefs of the donor
(recipient) on the frequency of intermediaries transferring: the donor’s (recipient’s) beliefs
that none, one, two or three out of three intermediaries transfer in full. For facilitating
decision-making, these first-order beliefs were presented in a fixed increasing order (see
an example of a decision screen in Appendix D.1).18
At the end of the session, the computer program randomly selected either the Low or
the High condition. Given the donor had given part of his endowment in this condition,
the program implemented the intermediary’s decision corresponding to the actual belief
of the donor or of the recipient, depending on the treatment, in this condition. This
determined the donor’s, the intermediary’s and the recipient’s payoffs in this part.
Second-Order Belief Elicitation and Social Norms
18The use of the menu method is frequent in the experimental literature on guilt aversion (Attanasi
et al., 2013; Khalmetski et al., 2015; Balafoutas and Fornwagner, 2017; Hauge, 2016; Bellemare et al.,
2017; Bellemare et al., 2018, Dhami et al., 2018). Although one might argue that responses elicited with
this method are ”cold”, this method offers several advantages. First, it allows us to rule out potential
false-consensus effects without raising the issue of strategic reporting and without using deception. The
false-consensus effect could be avoided by communicating the donors’ (recipients’) true beliefs to the
intermediaries. However, it requires choosing between two evils: if the donors (recipients) know that
their beliefs will be communicated, they are likely to distort them; and if they do not know that their
beliefs will be communicated, the design is arguably deceptive. The menu method avoids these drawbacks.
Moreover, it allows us to study guilt aversion at the individual level and, hence, to unveil inter-individual
differences that are hidden at the aggregate level (Khalmetski et al., 2015).
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In the third part of the experiment, we elicited the second-order beliefs of the donors
and of the intermediaries on the other players’ first-order beliefs, both in the Low and
in the High conditions. Donors had to guess their intermediary’s and their recipient’s
first-order beliefs on the donors’ decisions (four second-order-beliefs in total). Similarly,
intermediaries had to guess their donor’s and their recipient’s first-order beliefs on the
intermediaries’ decisions (four second-order-beliefs in total). A second-order-beliefs is
considered correct if it corresponds to the partner’s actual first-order belief.
Moreover, anticipating that behavior in this game may depend on social norms and
on the beliefs about others’ social norms, at the beginning of the third part we elicited
all the subjects’ social norms in the session and, at the end of this part, we elicited the
donors’ and the intermediaries’ beliefs about their partners’ social norms.19
The players’ social norms were identified, using the Krupka and Weber’s (2013) pro-
cedure, for each possible decision both in the Low and in the High conditions. In each
condition, players had to rate the social appropriateness of each decision on a four-item
scale (eight answers in total). An answer is considered correct if it corresponds to the
modal answer of the subjects in the same role. Using coordination games among players
with the same role to incentivize this procedure allows us to identify whether social norms
differ across roles. In fact, similarly to Erkut et al. (2005), we found that social norms
do not differ across roles in seven out of eight cases (Kruskal-Wallis tests, see Table B.7
in Appendix).20
Then, at the end of the third part, donors had to guess their intermediary’s and their
recipient’s ratings of the social appropriateness of the donors’ possible decisions (four
19Note that d’Adda et al. (2016) found no difference in responses between eliciting normative judgments
a` la Krupka and Weber before or after playing the main game.
20Ratings of social appropriateness differ in one instance only: in the Low condition, intermediaries
consider that embezzling is less socially appropriate than donors do.
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answers). Similarly, intermediaries had to guess their donor’s and their recipient’s rat-
ings of the social appropriateness of the intermediaries’ possible decisions (four answers).
Recipients had no guess to report.
For each subject, we randomly selected one answer among all those provided during
this third part. A correct answer paid e1.
Elicitation of Individual Characteristics
Since our model predicts that guilt proneness affects behavior in the game (Hypothesis
HI3), we elicited the subjects’ social preferences by means of several tests. A survey was
completed online about a week prior the laboratory session to limit the risk of contami-
nation between this task and the game. Subjects were paid a flat fee of e7 for completing
this survey on time and for showing-up at the session in the laboratory.
The survey was composed of four parts (see Appendix D.2). In the first part, subjects
completed the Guilt and Shame Proneness (GASP) questionnaire of Cohen et al. (2011).
We were particularly attentive to the Guilt-Negative-Behavior-Evaluation subscale that
assesses one’s proneness to feel bad about how one acted. The second and third parts
were included to control for potentially relevant psychological traits and to conceal our
interest in guilt proneness. The second part corresponds to the Honesty-Humility scale
extracted from the 100-item HEXACO Personality Inventory – Revised test (Ashton and
Lee, 2008). We were interested in the responses to the Fairness subscale that aims at
assessing a tendency to avoid dishonesty. The third part consists of 16 questions from
the Self-Reported Altruism Scale (Rushton et al., 1981). Finally, in the fourth part, we
collected standard socio-demographic characteristics, including gender, age, professional
status, number of past participations in economic experiments, self-reported risk attitudes
(using the procedure of Dohmen et al., 2011), and self-reported time preferences (using
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the procedure of Visher et al., 2013).
3.2 Procedures
The experiment was conducted at GATE-Lab, Lyon, France. It was computerized using
the software Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were recruited mainly from the under-
graduate student population of local business, engineering, and medical schools by email,
using the software Hroot (Bock et al., 2014). 369 subjects participated in a total of 19
sessions. 52.72% are females and the average age is 21.85 years (S.D. = 4.54). Table B.1
in Appendix summarizes the characteristics of each session.
When subjects registered for the experiment, about a week before the date of the lab
session, they were sent an invitation email to complete the online questionnaire. Com-
pleting the questionnaire took about 10 minutes. Participants were informed that they
would receive their fixed payment of e7 for this task and for showing-up at the end of
the laboratory session. Only those who completed the online questionnaire were allowed
to participate in the session. In the lab session, at their arrival subjects were randomly
assigned to a cubicle after drawing a tag in an opaque bag. The instructions (see Ap-
pendix D.1) were distributed for each part after completion of the previous part. Before
the first part, subjects had to answer a comprehension questionnaire. In the first part,
subjects reported their first-order beliefs and donors made their decisions. In the second
part, intermediaries made their decisions. In the third part, we elicited the subjects’ social
norms and second-order beliefs.
Each session lasted about 75 minutes. The average earnings were e17.70 (S.D. =
6.19), including the e7 fee for completing the online questionnaire and for showing-up.
Earnings were paid in private in a separate room.
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4 Results
We begin this section by two comments on the subjects’ social norms and beliefs. Sum-
mary statistics and significance tests are displayed in Table B.2 in Appendix. First, Give
and Transfer choices, respectively, are rated by the subjects as significantly more socially
appropriate than Keep and Embezzle choices, respectively, in both conditions (Wilcoxon
signed rank tests, W hereafter, p < 0.001). Second, the donors’ second-order beliefs
(SOB, hereafter) are accurate guesses of the intermediaries’ and recipients’ first-order be-
liefs (FOB, hereafter) on the frequency of Give choices in both conditions (Mann-Whitney
rank sum tests, MW hereafter, between SOB and FOB, smallest p = 0.44). However, in-
termediaries tend to overestimate the donor’s and recipient’s FOB on the frequency of
Transfer choices (MW tests, p < 0.05 in three out four cases).
In the following, we consider first the donors’ behavior (Section 4.1) and next, the
intermediaries’ behavior (Section 4.2). We proceed by testing the behavioral hypotheses
according to the order they have been introduced in Section 2.3. For each behavioral
hypothesis, we also check for treatment differences, under the label [Donor vs. Recipient
treatments].
Finally, in this paper, except when specified otherwise, the tests are two-sided, an
independent observation corresponds to a decision (since only one decision per participant
is payoff relevant) and the results from the two treatments are pooled.
4.1 Donors’ Behavior
Our theoretical model is consistent with three patterns of donors’ behavior: (i) Keep in
both conditions (this is the case for 46.34% of the donors), (ii) Give in both conditions
(31.70% of the donors), or (iii) Give only in the Low condition (17.07% of the donors).
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Only 4.87% of the donors choose Give only in the High condition, a behavior inconsistent
with our model. Figure 2 displays, for each condition, the proportion of donors who
choose either Give or Keep, depending on their FOB on the frequency of Transfer choices
(see also Table B.3 in Appendix). It illustrates our two results on the donors’ behavior.
Figure 2: Distribution of the donors’ choices depending on their first-order beliefs
Note: One donor had a FOB of 1 in the Low condition; as well as two donors in the High condition.
Result D1 [Choice-Belief Correlation]: The higher the donors’ FOB about Transfer,
the higher the frequency of Give choices. This holds for both conditions.
Support for Result D1: There is a significant positive correlation between the
donors’ FOB about Transfer and their decision to Give (Spearman rank correlation, S
hereafter, rs = 0.35, p < 0.001). When we distinguish between conditions, the correlation
in the Low condition (S correlation, rs = 0.51, p < 0.001) is significantly higher than
in the High condition (S correlation, rs = 0.22, p < 0.001) (ZPF statistic, z = 3.05,
p < 0.001).21
21The correlation between the donors’ FOB and their decision to Give must be regarded with caution.
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[Donor vs. Recipient treatments]: The correlation between the donors’ FOB on the
frequency of Transfer choices and their decision to Give is not different across treatments
(Recipient treatment: rs = 0.24, p < 0.001; Donor treatment: rs = 0.44, p < 0.001; Z
test, z = −1.23, p = 0.210).
Result D2 [High vs. Low Condition on Choice]: Controlling for the donors’ FOB
about Transfer, the frequency of Give choices is higher in the Low than in the High
condition.
Support for Result D2: We use Mc Nemar tests (MN, hereafter) to consider each
donor as an independent observation. For a given FOB about Transfer, the frequency
of Give choices is significantly higher in the Low than in the High condition (MN tests;
FOB(0): χ2=4.76, p = 0.029; FOB (0.33): χ2=3.60, p = 0.057).22
[Donor vs. Recipient treatments]: Even though donors could not know which treat-
ment is implemented when they made their choices, our results differ across treatments.
Result D2 is supported in the Donor treatment (MN tests; FOB(0): χ2=3.57, p = 0.058;
FOB (0.33): χ2=3.00, p = 0.083) but not in the Recipient Treatment (MN tests; FOB(0):
χ2=1.60, p = 0.205; FOB (0.33): χ2=1.29, p = 0.252).
Although belief elicitation was incentivized, it is possible that donors who planned to Keep may have
underestimated their FOB about Transfer to justify their selfish choice. We consider the donors’ rating
of the social appropriateness of embezzling as a proxy for their FOB on the frequency of Transfer choices
because (i) they are significantly correlated (S correlation, rs = −0.19, p < 0.001), and (ii) we believe
that it is more unlikely that donors used their rating of the social appropriateness of embezzling, rather
then their FOB, as a justification of their choice. We replicate the correlation with the ratings of the
social appropriateness of embezzling (S correlation, rs = −0.20, p < 0.001).
22No donor had a FOB of either 0.66 in both conditions or 1 in both conditions.
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4.2 Intermediaries’ Behavior
Our theoretical model is consistent with two patterns of intermediaries’ behavior: (i)
always choose Embezzle, which characterizes selfish intermediaries, and (ii) switching from
choosing Embezzle to choosing Transfer as the induced SOB increases, which characterizes
guilt-averse intermediaries. Our model captures more than 70% of the observed behavior:
on average, 46.75% of the intermediaries are selfish and 24.39% are guilt-averse when we
pool the two treatments. The remaining intermediaries behave as follows: 11.79% always
choose Transfer, thereby exhibiting belief-independent social preferences; 11.79% switch
multiple times between transferring and embezzling; 5.28% exhibit an inverse switching
pattern from transferring to embezzling.
Figure 3: Distribution of the intermediaries’ choices depending on their induced second-
order beliefs
Figure 3 displays, for each condition, the proportion of intermediaries who choose
either Transfer or Embezzle, depending on their induced SOB (see also Table B.4 in
Appendix). It illustrates our two results on the intermediaries’ behavior.
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Result I1 [Choice-Belief Correlation]: The higher the intermediaries’ SOB about
Transfer, the higher the frequency of Transfer choices. This holds independently of the
condition.
Support for Result I1: There is a significant positive correlation between the inter-
mediaries’ induced SOB about Transfer and their Transfer choice (S correlation, rs=0.15,
p <0.001). The correlation does not vary between conditions (Low: rs= 0.17, p <0.001;
High: rs = 0.18, p <0.001). Note that, if we exclude the intermediaries who believed that
no donor would Give in either condition, the correlation increases to rs = 0.22 (p <0.001).
Indeed, these excluded intermediaries may suffer from an hypothetical bias, as they be-
lieve that their choices will not be payoff-relevant, rendering the hypothetical decision
to embezzle less psychologically costly. Interestingly, if we correlate the intermediaries’
Transfer choices with their stated SOB rather than with their induced SOB, the correla-
tion increases to rs = 0.27 (p <0.001).
23 We also find support for Result I1 using a Logit
model with fixed effects (Table 1) and with random effects as well as individuals controls
(Table B.5 in Appendix).
[Donor vs. Recipient treatments]: The correlation between the intermediaries’ induced
SOB about Transfer and their Transfer choices does not vary significantly across treat-
ments (Donor treatment: rs=0.14, p <0.001; Recipient treatment: rs = 0.15, p <0.001;
Z-test, z=0.05, p=0.95) (see also Table 1 in Appendix).
Result I2 [High vs. Low condition on Choice]: Controlling for the intermediaries’
SOB about Transfer, the frequency of a Transfer choices does not differ across conditions.
23We interpret this increase as evidence of a false-consensus effect (Ross, 1977; Vanberg, 2008). Ex-
periments using stated SOB should not ignore this effect as it leads to an upward-bias measure of the
correlation between SOB and choices (see consistent results in Khalmetski et al., 2015; and Bellemare et
al., 2017a).
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All
treatments
Recipient
treatment
Donor
treatment
Hypothetical
Bias Excluded
All
treatments
Induced SOB 0.67*** 0.75*** 0.62*** 0.81***
(0.09) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11)
Low Condition 0.06 -0.13 0.21 0.10 -0.24
(0.20) (0.30) (0.26) (0.22) (0.52)
Stated SOB 1.27**
(0.63)
# Observations 472 216 256 400 42
# Participants 59 27 32 50 21
Notes: In the four first columns, the dependent variable is the decision to Transfer made for a given
induced SOB. In the last column, the dependent variable is the decision to Transfer made when the
induced SOB corresponded to the stated SOB. Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 1: Regression on the decision to Transfer (Logit model with fixed effects)
Support for Result I2: We use MN tests to consider each intermediary as an
independent observation. For a given induced SOB, the frequency of a Transfer choices
does not significantly differ across conditions (smallest p = 0.438) (see also Table 1 in
Appendix).
[Donor vs. Recipient treatments]: We replicate this result when we distinguish be-
tween the Donor and the Recipient treatments in seven out of eight cases (MN tests for
each induced SOB, smallest p = 0.256), with one exception (Recipient treatment when
SOB=0.33: χ2=4.50, p = 0.033) (see also Table 1 in Appendix).
Result I3 [Choice-Guilt Correlation]: The higher the guilt-sensitivity, (i) the higher
the frequency of a Transfer choice controlling for intermediaries’ SOB; (ii) the lower the
minimum SOB sufficient to switch from Embezzle to Transfer. This holds regardless of
the condition.
Support for Result I3: We consider the Guilt-Negative-Behavior-Evaluation score
(Guilt-NBE score, hereafter) elicited in the pre-experimental survey as a proxy for the
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guilt-sensitivity parameter in our model. Table 2 presents (i) the correlation between
the Transfer choices, holding the induced SOB constant, and the Guilt-NBE score, as
well as (ii) the correlation between the switching SOB and the Guilt-NBE score. The
switching SOB corresponds to the minimum induced SOB sufficient to choose Transfer
rather than Embezzle.24 The Guilt-NBE score in itself is only marginally significantly
correlated with Transfer choices. However, the significance of this correlation can be
improved if we interact this score with the Fairness score (which measures a tendency to
avoid dishonesty) or with a dummy variable that takes value 0 if the intermediary believes
that no donor will choose Give in either condition, and 1 otherwise. This suggests that
the Guilt-NBE score is a relevant proxy for the guilt-sensitivity parameter but only when
intermediaries already have a high moral stand on corruption or when they are sure their
decision will be implemented.
[Donor vs. Recipient treatments]: The magnitude of this correlation is lower in the
Donor treatment than in the Recipient treatment, but not significantly so (Z-tests, small-
est p = 0.14).
Result I4 [Donor vs. Recipient]: All our hypotheses hold independently of whether
guilt is directed toward the donor or toward the recipient.
Support for Result I4: For each result, see (the absence of) treatment difference
under the label [Donor vs. Recipient treatments].
24For an intermediary who always Transfers, the swithching SOB is 0 ; for an intermediary who
Embezzles when the induced SOB is 0 and Transfers when the induced SOB is {0.33; 0.66; 1}, the switching
SOB is 0.33 ; etc. We cannot compute a switching SOB for intermediaries who exhibited multiples switches
or an inverse switching pattern.
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Recipient treatment Donor treatment
Guilt Guilt x
Fairness
Guilt x
Hypoth.
Guilt Guilt x
Fairness
Guilt x
Hypoth.
Transfer | SOB=0 0.17 0.27** 0.23* 0.10 0.16 0.27**
Transfer | SOB=0.33 0.43*** 0.49*** 0.46*** 0.19 0.28** 0.39***
Transfer | SOB=0.66 0.19* 0.26** 0.43*** 0.15 0.22* 0.47***
Transfer | SOB=1 0.23* 0.31** 0.52*** 0.11 0.14 0.49***
Switching SOB -0.10 -0.20* -0.34*** -0.14 -0.16 -0.49***
Notes: This table presents the Spearman correlation between row and column variables.
Standard errors in parentheses; * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
Rows: The first four lines represent the total of Transfer choices given each induced FOB: 0 if
Transfer in neither condition, 1 if Transfer in one condition, 2 if Transfer in both conditions.
The fifth line represents the switching SOB of intermediaries who either always embezzle or are
guilt-averse.
SOB stands for second-order beliefs. Guilt stands for Guilt-NBE score (GASP questionnaire).
Fairness stands for fairness score (HEXACO questionnaire). Hypoth. stands for a dummy
variable that takes value 0 if the intermediary believes no donor will choose Give in either
condition, and 1 otherwise.
Table 2: Correlation between the intermediaries’ decisions and their Guilt-NBE score
4.3 A Structural Estimate of Guilt Sensitivity
Figure 4 presents the distribution of the switching SOB observed in the two treatments.
[Donor vs. Recipient treatments]: The distributions of switching SOB do not differ
significantly across treatments (Kruskal-Wallis test, p >0.10).
Following Bellemare et al. (2011), we defined a structural econometric model (Eq.
12) to estimate the intermediaries’ average guilt-sensitivity parameter, θIj, toward the
donor (j = D, in the Donor treatment) and the receiver (j = R, in the Donor treatment).
Equation 12 folows our modeling of the intermediary’s guilt aversion toward the donor
and the recipient (Eq. 5). The utility of an intermediary I who takes a decision sI ∈
{Transfer, Embezzle} is composed of two terms. First, it depends on the intermediary’s
material payoff when choosing sI : MI(sI). Second, it depends on the intermediary’s guilt
toward the other player j when choosing sI : GIj(sI), with j = D,R. The intermediary’s
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Figure 4: Distribution of the intermediaries’ switching second-order beliefs
Note: For instance, in the Recipient Treatment, 3% of the intermediaries have a switching SOB of 1
(i.e. chose Embezzle for induced SOB of {0; 0.33; 0.66} and Transfer for an induced SOB of 1) and 51%
of intermediaries always Embezzled irrespective of the induced SOB.
guilt is the difference, if positive, between the other player’s (j) first-order belief (αjI) on
the recipient’s material payoff and the recipient’s actual payoff.
UI(sI , αjI , θIj) = MI(sI) + θIjGIj(sI)
= MI(sI) + θIj [αjI(T ) ·MR(T ) + (1− αjI(T )) ·MR(E)−MR(sI)] (12)
We used a conditional Logit model to estimate θI , the coefficient corresponding toGIj(sI),
while fixing to 1 the coefficient corresponding to MI(sI). The results reported in Table 3
show that the average intermediary is willing to give up embezzling 0.12 ECU if embezzling
increases another player’s disappointment (difference between expectations and actual
outcome) by 1 ECU. When we exclude intermediaries who believed that no donor chose
to Give (those potentially subject to an hypothetical bias), the estimated guilt-sensitivity
parameter increases up to 0.20.
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[Donor vs. Recipient treatments]: Comparing the estimated parameter across treat-
ments, we find a significant difference. Intermediaries seems to be slightly more sensitive
to recipient’s guilt (+18%) (Z-test25, χ2=-2, p=0.04).
All treatments Recipient
treatment
Donor
treatment
Subjects with
Hypothetical
Bias Excluded
θI -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.11*** -0.20***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 123 62 61 83
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3: Structural estimates of the guilt-sensitivity parameter
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this study we investigated theoretically and experimentally the role of guilt aversion
in the behavior of intermediaries confronted with an opportunity to embezzle a donation.
Using psychological game theory, our aim was to determine (i) whether others’ expec-
tations influence the decision to embezzle, and if so (ii) whether the impact of others’
expectations on behavior is different if others are the donors or the potential benefi-
ciaries of the donation. Extending Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) model to capture
guilt aversion toward the donor and documenting its existence and features by means
of a laboratory experiment are the two original contributions of our paper. Indeed, be-
yond showing evidence of guilt-averse behavior, the recent experimental literature on guilt
aversion has often pursued three separate objectives: measuring the prevalence of guilt
aversion in the population and its magnitude, and identifying a survey-based measure of
guilt aversion. To our knowledge, we are the first to address these three questions in a
25See Paternoster et al. (1998).
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single paper. More importantly, we also consider a new direction of guilt whose existence
was not documented yet: guilt directed toward a player whose payoffs cannot be affected
by the agent’s decision.
We found that (i) on average, about 25 % of intermediaries are affected by others’
expectations in the way predicted by our guilt-aversion model, and the proportion of
guilt-averse intermediaries is not affected by the direction of the guilt; (ii) on average, an
intermediary is willing to give up embezzling 0.12 ECU if embezzling increases another
player’s disappointment by 1 ECU, but the intensity of the structurally estimated guilt-
sensitivity parameter is higher when the intermediary is confronted with the recipient’s
expectations (0.13) compared to the donor’s ones (0.11).
Thus, our results extend the recent strand of the literature aiming at estimating the
proportion of guilt-averse individuals in the population that was so far limited to Dic-
tator games (see Table C.1 in Appendix). Our structural estimates of guilt sensitivity
are in the lower range of values previously obtained through structural or equilibrium
estimations (see Table C.2 in Appendix). A possible interpretation is that since our
game involves more than one active role, the intermediaries’ feeling of responsibility is
more diluted than in games in which only one player is active. Finally, we report a
significant positive correlation between the intermediaries’ switching second-order beliefs
and their Guilt-Negative-Behavior-Evaluation score, but only when intermediaries already
have high moral standards. This finding contributes to the small but inclusive literature
trying to identify the link between survey-based measures of guilt and experimental deci-
sions (see Table C.3 in Appendix). Overall, these contrasted results call for more research
on the nature of the emotions embedded in the Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) guilt-
aversion model.
Showing evidence that intermediaries care about others’ expectations suggests that
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anti-corruption policies could benefit from developing interventions making donors’ and
recipients’ expectations of good behavior more salient to the intermediaries, promoting
especially the high expectations others hold. We already know that public campaigns
of information (Reinikka and Svensson, 2011) or framing manipulations (Ockenfels and
Werner, 2014) affect decisions through beliefs. But so far, attention has been focused on
the potential recipients’ expectations. Our findings show that future policies should also
consider the sensitiveness of intermediaries to the donors’ expectations (e.g., tax payers,
charitable donors) (see also the literature on trust-responsiveness, e.g., Guerra and Zizzo,
2004; Bacharrach et al., 2007). Another implication of our findings is related to social
norms. By enlarging the perspective to a dynamic setting, as in Balafoutas (2011), we
could contribute to explain the “vicious circle” of corruption. If donors or recipients
expect a high level of embezzlement in the society, intermediaries may embezzle without
feeling guilty, which in turn increases the expectations of embezzlement.
We measured guilt aversion toward the donor and toward the recipient in two sep-
arate treatments. A straightforward extension would be to test a treatment in which
intermediaries would be informed about both donors’ and recipients’ expectations. This
would lead to a more complex design, though. Finally, one may worry about the external
validity of our findings since our experiment has been conducted in an artificial setting in
a developed country. We remain confident that our experiment captures some important
features of the real-life environment, such as the significant difference between the social
appropriateness of transferring vs. embezzling, or the fact that donors condition their
donation on their belief that intermediaries will transfer it honestly (see also Chlaß et al.,
2015). Moreover, in a bribery experiment conducted both in the field in the lab, in Burk-
ina Faso and in Canada, Armantier and Boly (2013) reported no significant difference in
behavior across contexts. Still, future research could test whether our results replicate in
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the field. A major challenge, though, will be to measure beliefs in the field. We leave this
to future investigations.
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Appendices
A Psychological Type Structure
The psychological type of the donor is characterized by his sensitivity to altruism, while
the one of the intermediary is characterized by his sensitivity to guilt. Therefore, we
can build a Harsanyi-type structure (as in Attanasi et al., 2016) where each subject in
role j = D, I,R is identified by his type tj, which comprises his psychological type and
his exogenous beliefs about the type of the co-player (exogenous higher-order beliefs).
Without loss of generality, the set of types may be assumed to be a Cartesian product
Tj = pj × ej, so that a type is a pair (pj, ej) of psychological and epistemic type, and
the exogenous beliefs about the co-players’ types are determined only by ej, the epistemic
type. We assume that the psychological and epistemic types of each player are statistically
independent, and that this is common knowledge. We make the auxiliary assumption
that in the Donor (Recipient) treatment the recipient’s (donor’s) type is not considered
in the type structure (see discussion at the end of Section 2.2.4). With this, in the
Donor treatment, a donor’s type is tD = (γD, eD) and an intermediary’s type is tI =
(θID, eID), where eD parametrizes the subjective probability assigned by the donor to
t¯ID = (θ¯ID, eID) – the positive-guilt type of the intermediary –, and eID parametrizes
the subjective probability assigned by the intermediary to t¯D = (γ¯D, eD) – the altruistic
type of the donor. In the Recipient treatment, because the recipient has only one possible
psychological type (he is selfish), the Harsanyi and the epistemic types coincide, tR =
eR, where eR parametrizes the subjective probability assigned by the recipient to t¯IR =
(θ¯IR, eIR), and eIR parametrizes the intermediary’s second-order exogenous beliefs over
θ¯IR, via eR.
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Differently from Attanasi et al. (2016), we do not use Bayesian equilibrium as solution
concept. We instead rely on two-step rationalizability with forward induction:
rationality (first step) and strong belief in rationality (second step). As highlighted by
Attanasi et al. (2013), this procedure provides coarse behavioral predictions with respect
to a Bayesian-equilibrium approach. However, it has a main methodological advantage
for psychological games with incomplete information: since subject j’s utility of outcomes
only depends on j’s own personal traits (and possibly on the co-player’s beliefs), the
analysis of players’ rationality is independent of whether there is complete or incomplete
information. The same is true, under mild assumptions on the donor’s psychological
type, for the analysis of strong belief in rationality by the intermediary. This allows us
to elaborate behavioral predictions without positing any specific assumption concerning
players’ epistemic types, i.e., over the exogenous beliefs about the co-player’s (first-
order exogenous beliefs) and their own (second-order exogenous beliefs) psychological
type. This is crucial especially in an experimental environment where exogenous beliefs
are not elicited (where, e.g., donors are not asked to guess how many intermediaries are
guilt-averse). Indeed, we only elicit and elaborate predictions on endogenous beliefs,
i.e., about players’ behavior, which can be later observed during the experiment. To the
best of our knowledge, not eliciting exogenous beliefs is common to all other experiments
on games with belief-dependent preferences.
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B Additional Tables
Session Participants Age Previous Exp. Economics Stud.
(#) (n) (mean) (mean) (%)
Donor Treatment
5 18 21.27 1.44 66.67
6 18 21.00 0.22 33.33
7 15 24.2 1.53 33.33
8 21 22.00 0.80 28.57
9 21 21.28 1.80 71.43
12 24 23.25 1.33 45.83
13 18 20.66 1.50 61.11
15 21 21.19 1.00 38.10
16 12 21.00 2.50 50.00
18 15 22.4 1.86 33.33
Sub-total 183 21.83 1.34 46.45
Recipient Treatment
1 18 21.77 1.16 77.78
2 21 19.76 0.90 57.14
3 15 20.93 0.26 80.00
4 21 20.85 1.14 52.38
10 18 22.88 1.16 61.11
11 27 22.30 1.96 62.96
14 24 21.50 2.20 54.17
17 27 24.59 2.70 55.56
19 15 21.00 2.46 46.67
Sub-total 186 21.87 1.63 60.22
Treatment
Difference
No1 No1 Yes2***
Total 369 21.85 1.49 53.39
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
1 Mann-Whitney ranks sum tests; 2 Fisher exact test
Table B.1: Summary statistics of participants per session
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Low z-stat High z-stat
On the donors’ behavior
Intermediaries’ FOB on the frequency of Give choices a 0.39
0.42
0.37
-0.21
Donors’ SOB on intermediaries’ FOB a 0.40 0.35
Recipients’ FOB on the frequency of Give choices a 0.40
-0.76
0.36
-0.30
Donors’ SOB on recipients’ FOB a 0.37 0.34
Social Norm on Send b 0.88
-16.10***
0.84
-15.78***
Social Norm on Keep b -0.48 -0.43
On the intermediaries’ behavior
Donors’ FOB on the frequency of Transfer choices a 0.20
-4.72***
0.25
-2.14**
Intermediaries’ SOB on donors’ FOB a 0.36 0.27
Recipients’ FOB on the frequency of Transfer choices a 0.21
3.15**
0.27
1.24
Intermediaries’ SOB on recipients’ FOB a 0.30 0.29
Social Norm on Transfer b 0.89
-14.45***
0.90
-15.74***
Social Norm on Embezzle b 0.19 -0.18
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
a Average beliefs on the frequency of choices are rated on scale from 0 (never) to 1 (always).
Differences between FOB and SOB are measured by Mann-Whitney rank sum tests.
b Average social norms are rated on a scale from − 1 (very socially inappropriate) to 1 (very
socially appropriate). Differences between social norms are measured by Wilcoxon signed rank
tests.
Table B.2: Summary statistics on beliefs and social norms
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Low Condition High Condition
% n % n
Give | FOB=0 27.54% 19 24.53% 13
Give | FOB=0.33 66.67% 24 43.75% 21
Give | FOB=0.66 94.12% 16 50.00% 10
Give | FOB=1 100% 1 50.00% 1
Notes: For each condition, a donor makes one choice given his FOB, e.g., in the Low condition,
among the donors whose FOB was 0.33, 66.67% chose Give.
Table B.3: Donors’ Give choices for a given FOB on the frequency of Transfer choices
Low Condition High Condition
% n % n
Transfer | SOB=0 21.95% 27 21.95% 27
Transfer | SOB=0.33 25.20% 31 27.76% 28
Transfer | SOB=0.66 33.33% 41 32.52% 40
Transfer | SOB=1 42.28% 52 43.09% 53
Notes: For each condition, an intermediary makes four choices given each induced SOB, e.g., in
the Low condition, when the induced SOB was 0.33, 25.20% of intermediaries chose Transfer.
Table B.4: Intermediaries’ Transfer choices for a given induced SOB
All
treatments
Recipient
treatment
Donor
treatment
Hypothetical
Bias Excluded
All
treatments
Induced SOB 0.75*** 0.76*** 0.74*** 0.90***
(0.10) (0.15) (0.13) (0.11)
Low Condition 0.08 -0.13 0.27 0.13 -0.04
(0.20) (0.30) (0.28) (0.23) (0.47)
Donor Treatment -0.94 -0.54 -0.93
(0.60) (0.61) (0.77)
Stated SOB 2.16***
(0.54)
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Observations 876 488 488 656 244
# Participants 122 61 61 82 122
Notes: In the four first columns, the dependent variable is the decision to Transfer made for a given
induced SOB. In the last column, the dependent variable is the decision to Transfer made when the
induced SOB corresponded to the stated SOB. Individual controls are: age, gender, guilt-NBE score,
fairness score. Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table B.5: Regression on the decision to Transfer (Logit model with random effects)
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Correlation between ... Risk-Aversion
FOB on Donors’ Behavior (Low condition) 0.06
FOB on Donors’ Behavior (High condition) 0.09
FOB on Intermediaries’ Behavior (Low condition) 0.04
FOB on Intermediaries’ Behavior (High condition) -0.02
N=123; Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
Table B.6: Correlation between recipients’ beliefs and recipients’ risk aversion
Low condition (χ2) High condition (χ2)
Social Norm on Give 4.17 2.59
Social Norm on Keep 3.61 2.39
Social Norm on Transfer 0.21 1.75
Social Norm on Embezzle 6.89** 0.97
Notes: Kruskal-Wallis tests. Standard errors in parentheses; * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p < 0.01.
a: The mean of the intermediaries (0.11) is smaller than the mean of the donors (0.28) (t-test, p <0.05).
Table B.7: Kruskal-Wallis tests of the difference in social norms distributions across roles
C Previous Literature
Study Game % N
Khalmetski et al. (2015) Dictator 37% 191
Balafoutas and Formwagner (2017) Dictator 18% 108
Bellemare et al. (2018) Dictator ≈ 65% 140
Our results Embezzlement 25% 123
Table C.1: Previous estimations of the proportion of guilt-averse individuals
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Study Game Estimation Treatment θi N
Bellemare et al. Proposal and
Structural
Dictators’ SOB 0.4 1078
(2011) Response Recipients’ FOB 0.8 540
Dictator Structural
Stake-independent 0.1 84
Bellemare et al. Low Stakes 0.4 56
(2018) Medium Stakes 0.6 56
High Stakes 1 56
Patel and Smith
(2018)
Participation Equilibrium 0.1 111
Equilibrium
Baseline 2.3 90
Tempting to coop. 1.8 92
Peeters, Vorsatz Prisonner Tempting to def. 2.5 96
(2018) Dilemma
Hypothetical
BDM
Baseline. 3.1 90
Tempting to coop. 2.1 92
Tempting to def. 3.5 96
Our results Embezzlement Structural
Toward Donor 0.1 61
Toward Recipient 0.1 62
Table C.2: Previous estimations of the guilt-sensitivity parameter
Correlation between ...
Study Game Trait Behaviour p < 0.1 N
Bracht and
Regner (2013)
Trust Guilt-NBE Pro-social choice Yes 192
Regner and
Harth (2014)
Trust Moulton’s a Pro-social choice Yes 127
Peeters and
Vorsatz (2018)
Prisonner
Dilemma
Guilt-NBE Estimated θ No 68
Our results Embezzlement Guilt-NBE
Pro-social choice Yes/No
123
Switching SOB Yes/No
Notes: a Regner and Harth (2014) used a one question out of the three included in the original
measure of Moulton et al. (1996): ”How easy is it for something to make you feel guilty? (1) very
easy, (2) easy, (3) difficult, (4) very difficult”.
Table C.3: Previous correlation of personality traits and behavioral outcomes
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D Online Appendices
D.1 Instructions for the lab experiment [Translated from French]
OVERVIEW OF THE SESSION
Thank you for participating in this experimental session on decision-making. During this
session, you can earn money. The amount of your earnings depends both on your decisions and
on other participants’ decisions. At the end of the session, you will receive your earnings in
cash, in a separate room to ensure the confidentiality of your earnings. The earnings you will
receive include:
• your earnings from today’s experimental session
• a e7 fee for having completed the online questionnaire and for showing-up on time
During the session, we will sometimes use ECU (Experimental Currency Units). The conversion
rate from ECU into Euro is the following: 10 ECU = e1.2.
Please turn off your phone. During the session, any communication with other participants is
forbidden. If you have any questions, raise your hand or press the red button on the side of your
desk. We will come answer to your questions in private.
At the beginning of the session, the program will form groups of three participants. You will
never know the identity of the other two members of your group, and they will never know your
identity. All your decisions and earnings are anonymous.
In each group, participants have a different role. There is:
• a donor
• an intermediary
• a recipient
Your screen will indicate your role when the session begins and you will keep the same role
throughout the session.
There are two possible situations: situation A and situation B. You will take your decisions in
both situations. At every moment, the situation in which you are will always be displayed on
the screen.
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Short description of the roles
ROLE OF THE DONOR
The donor receives an initial endowment of 150 ECU.
The donor’s task is to choose how many ECU to give to the recipient.
For each situation, the donor decides either:
• to give 25 ECU to the recipient
• or to give 0 ECU to the recipient
Regardless of the situation, his/her payoff is equal to: 150 ECU – the ECU given.
Important : The donor cannot give ECU directly to the recipient. Only the intermediary can
transfer the ECU given by the donor to the recipient.
ROLE OF THE INTERMEDIARY
The intermediary receives an initial endowment of 80 ECU.
The intermediary’s task is to transfer the entirety of the ECU given by the donor to the
recipient.
• If the donor has given 25 ECU:
In situation A, the intermediary can decide either:
– to transfer the entirety of the 25 ECU to the recipient
– or to transfer 10 ECU to the recipient and keep 15 ECU for himself/herself
In situation B, the intermediary can decide either:
– to transfer the entirety of the 25 ECU to the recipient
– or to transfer 5 ECU to the recipient and keep 20 ECU for himself/herself
• If the donor has given 0 ECU: The intermediary does not make any decision.
Regardless of the situation, his/her payoff is equal to: 80 ECU + the ECU kept for him-
self/herself.
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Important: For every ECU transferred to the recipient by the intermediary, the recipient receives
2 ECU. For example, if the intermediary transfers 25 ECU, the recipient receives 50 ECU; if the
intermediary transfers 5 ECU, the recipient receives 10 ECU.
ROLE OF THE RECIPIENT
The recipient receives an initial endowment of 10 ECU.
The recipient does not make any decision.
Regardless of the situation, his/her payoff is equal to: 10 ECU + (2 x the number of ECU
transferred by the intermediary).
Short description of the stages
The session is composed of four stages:
• Stage 1: All the participants answer to some questions.
• Stage 2: The donor makes his/her decisions.
• Stage 3: The intermediary makes his/her decisions.
• Stage 4: All the participants answer to some questions.
At the end of the session:
• All the participants are informed of the randomly selected situation, of the decisions made
by the group members in the randomly selected situation, and of their personal earnings.
• All the participants have to complete a final questionnaire.
Personal Login
When I have finished reading these instructions, please enter your personal login on your screen.
It corresponds to the personal login you created yourself when you completed the online ques-
tionnaire. As a reminder: we advised you to use “Your mother’s or father’s first name – his/her
day of birth – his/her month of birth” without space or dash. If your mother is called Brigitte
and she was born on a 19th of May, it yields ”Brigitte1905”. Once you have entered your per-
sonal login, click ”Continue”.
Comprehension Questionnaire
You have to complete a comprehension questionnaire. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand or press the red button. We will come answer to your questions in private.
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***
Once all participants have completed the comprehension questionnaire, the session will start.
The role that has been randomly assigned to you will be displayed on your screen. You will then
receive more detailed instructions.
[The next set of instructions was distributed after the comprehension questionnaire.]
STAGE 1
In this stage, all the participants have to answer to some questions.
If you are an intermediary or a recipient: You will have to answer to the following question:
“Among 3 donors randomly selected in today’s session, in your opinion how many of these
donors will give 25 ECU to the recipient?”. You have to enter a number between 0 and 3,
inclusive.
You have to answer to this question twice: once in situation A, and once in situation B.
If you are a donor or a recipient: You will have to answer to the following question: “Among
3 intermediaries randomly selected in today’s session, if their donor decides to give 25 ECU to
the recipient, in your opinion how many of these intermediaries will transfer the 25 ECU to the
recipient?”.
You have to answer to this question twice: once in situation A, and once in situation B.
In total,
1. If you are a donor, you have to answer to two questions about the intermediaries’ decisions
(in situation A and in situation B);
2. If you are an intermediary, you have to answer to two questions about the donors’ deci-
sions (in situation A and in situation B);
3. If you are a recipient, you have to answer to two questions about the donors’ decisions (in
situation A and in situation B) and to two questions about the intermediaries’ decisions
(in situation A and in situation B).
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STAGE 2
In this stage, the donors make their decisions.
If you are an intermediary or a recipient, you do not make any decision in this stage.
If you are a donor, your task is to decide whether to give 25 ECU or 0 ECU to the recipient.
In total, you have to make two decisions: one in situation A, and one in situation B. However,
only one decision will count to determine the payoff of the group members.
Important : When you make your decisions, you do not know which one of your decision will
count. You should give the same weight to each of these decisions since you do not know which
one will determine the payoffs of the group members.
Which of the donor’s decisions determine the payoffs of the group members?
At the end of the session, the computer program will randomly select situation A or situation
B. The donor’s decision that will count is the decision that was made in the selected situation.
How does the donor’s decision affect the payoffs of the group members?
If the donor has chosen to give 0 ECU to the recipient in the randomly selected situation, the
payoff of each group member is the following:
• The donor’s payoff is 150 ECU.
• The intermediary’s payoff is 80 ECU.
• The recipient’s payoff is 10 ECU.
If the donor has chosen to give 25 ECU to the recipient in the randomly selected situation:
• The donor’s payoff is 125 ECU.
• - The intermediary’s and the recipient’s payoffs depend on the intermediary’s decisions in
the third stage.
At the end of the session, you will be informed of the donor’s decision in the randomly selected
situation.
***
If you have any question, please raise your hand or press the red button. We will come answer
to your questions in private.
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[The next set of instructions was distributed after stages 1 and 2.]
STAGE 3
In this stage, the intermediaries make their decisions.
If you are a donor or a recipient, you do not make any decision in this stage.
If you are an intermediary, your task is to transfer the entirety of the ECU given by the donor
to the recipient.
You have to make several decisions. Look at the screenshot below. There are two pieces of in-
formation in bold characters on the screen: these are the two pieces of information that change
for each of the decisions.
Figure D.1: Screenshot for the *Donor Treatment*
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Figure D.2: Screenshot for the *Recipient Treatment*
• Information on the situation
You have to make a decision in both situation A and situation B. The order of appearance of
these situations on your screen is random.
• Information on your *donor*/*recipient*’s guess
Remember that in the first stage the *donor*/*recipient* in your group has answered to the
following question: “Among 3 intermediaries randomly selected in today’s session, if their donor
decides to give 25 ECU to the recipient, in your opinion how many of these intermediaries will
transfer the 25 ECU to the recipient?”. There were four possible answers: 0, 1, 2 or 3. You have
to make a decision for each of the possible answers.
When you make your decisions, you do not know how many ECU the donor in your group has
decided to give to the recipient. You have to make your decisions assuming that the donor has
given 25 ECU.
In total, you have to make eight decisions: four decisions corresponding to the four possible an-
swers of the *donor*/*recipient* in your group in situation A, and four decisions corresponding
to the four possible answers of the *donor*/*recipient* in your group in situation B.
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Important: When you make your decisions, you do not know which one of your decision will
count. You should give the same weight to each of your decisions since you do not know which
one will determine the payoff of the group members.
Which of the intermediary’s decisions will determine the payoff of the group mem-
bers?
• If the donor has chosen to give 0 ECU to the recipient: none of the intermediary’s decisions
will determine the payoff of the group members.
• If the donor has chosen to give 25 ECU to the recipient: one of the intermediary’s decisions
will determine the payoff of the group members.
At the end of the session, the computer program will randomly select situation A or situation
B. Among the intermediary’s decisions made in the randomly selected situation, the computer
program selects the decision corresponding to the answer given by the *donor*/*recipient* of
your group in the first stage. It is this decision that determines the payoff of the group members.
Example: Suppose that the program randomly selects situation A. Suppose then that, to the
question “In situation B, among 3 intermediaries randomly selected in today’s session, if their
donor decides to give 25 ECU to the recipient, in your opinion how many of these intermediaries
will transfer 25 ECU to the recipient?”, the *donor*/*recipient* of your group has answered
“x”. Then, the program selects the decision made by the intermediary when his/her screen
displayed “Situation B” and “Your *donor*/*recipient* believes that x intermediaries among 3
randomly selected today will transfer 25 ECU.”
How does the intermediary’s decision affect the payoff of the group members?
If the donor has given 25 ECU to the recipient in the randomly selected situation, one of the
intermediary’s decisions determines the payoffs of the group members.
The intermediary may have made three types of decisions:
• Regardless of the situation, if the intermediary transfers 25 ECU to the recipient, the
intermediary’s payoff is 80 ECU and the recipient’s payoff is 60 ECU.
• If situation A is randomly selected and if the intermediary transfers 10 ECU to the recip-
ient and keeps 15 ECU for himself/herself, the intermediary’s payoff is 95 ECU and the
recipient’s payoff is 30 ECU.
• If situation B is randomly selected and if the intermediary transfers 5 ECU to the recipi-
ent and keeps 20 ECU for himself/herself, the intermediary’s payoff is 100 ECU and the
recipient’s payoff is 20 ECU.
At the end of the session, you will be informed of the donor’s decision in the randomly selected
situation.
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***
If you have any questions, please raise your hand or press the red button. We will come answer
to your questions in private.
[The next set of instructions was distributed after the stage 3]
STAGE 4
1) First, all the participants have to answer to questions of type 1.
You have to evaluate the different possible decisions of a donor and of an intermediary. More
precisely, for each possible decision of a donor or of an intermediary, you are asked to indicate
whether this decision is socially appropriate and consistent with moral or proper social behavior,
or socially inappropriate and inconsistent with moral or proper behavior.
Consider that a decision is socially appropriate if the majority of people agree to say that it is
the correct or ethical thing to do. You have to rate each decision using the following scale: very
socially inappropriate, somewhat socially inappropriate, somewhat socially appropriate or very
socially appropriate.
2) Then, the donor and the intermediary have to answer to questions of type 2.
You are asked to guess the decision made by a participant earlier in the session.
How do the answers affect your earnings?
At the end of the session, for each role, the program will randomly select one of the questions
to which you have answered in this stage. If you are a recipient, the randomly selected question
is for sure a question of type 1. If you are a donor or an intermediary, the question randomly
selected can be question of type 1 or a question of type 2.
• If the randomly selected question is a question of type 1:
Your earning depends on the answers of the other participants in the same role as you in to-
day’s session. The computer program determines the answer given by the highest number of
participants in the same role as you (you included) to this question. You earn 1 if your answer
corresponds to the answer the most frequently given by participants in the same role as you. In
case of a tie between two answers, the program randomly selects one of the tie answers.
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Example: Suppose there are six participants in today’s session who have the role of donors.
A question of type 1 is randomly selected. To that question, one donor has answered “ very
socially inappropriate”, two donors have answered “somewhat socially appropriate” and three
donors have answered “very socially appropriate”. The answer the most frequently given by the
donors is “very socially appropriate”. Then, the three donors who have answered “very socially
appropriate” earn 1, the other donors earn nothing.
• If the randomly selected question is a question of type 1:
If you have guessed correctly a previous decision, you earn 1.
END OF THE SESSION
At the end of the session, you will be informed of the situation randomly selected, of the de-
cisions made by your group members in the randomly selected situation, and of your personal
payoff. Then, you will be asked to complete a final questionnaire.
At the end of the session, please remain seated and silent until an experimenter invites you to
proceed to the payment room. At this moment, bring only your computer tag and your payment
receipt completed with you.
***
If you have any questions, please raise your hand or press the red button. We will come answer
to your questions in private.
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D.2 Online Questionnaire [Translated from French]
PART 0 - Introduction
Thank you for accepting to answer this questionnaire in order to complete your registration to
the experiment. Answering to this questionnaire will take approximately 10 minutes. Please read
carefully each sentence and remain concentrated. We are interested in your genuine answers,
not what you think you should answer.
PART 1 - GASP Questionnaire (Cohen et al., 2011)
Here are situations that people are likely to encounter in day-to-day life, followed by common
reactions to those situations. As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation.
Please indicate the likelihood that you would react in the way described by using the following
categories: (1) Very Unlikely, (2) Unlikely, (3) Slightly Likely, (4) Unlikely, (5) About 50%
Likely, (6) Slightly Likely, (7) Very Likely.
1. After realizing you have received too much change at a store, you decide to keep it because
the salesclerk does not notice. What is the likelihood that you would feel uncomfortable
about keeping the money?
2. You are privately informed that you are the only one in your group that did not make the
honor society because you skipped too many days of school. What is the likelihood that
this would lead you to become more responsible about attending school?
3. You rip an article out of a journal in the library and take it with you. Your teacher
discovers what you did and tells the librarian and your entire class. What is the likelihood
that this would make you would feel like a bad person?
4. After making a big mistake on an important project at work in which people were depend-
ing on you, your boss criticizes you in front of your co-workers. What is the likelihood
that you would feign sickness and leave work?
5. You reveal a friend’s secret, though your friend never finds out. What is the likelihood
that your failure to keep the secret would lead you to exert extra effort to keep secrets in
the future?
6. You give a bad presentation at work. Afterwards your boss tells your co-workers it was
your fault that your company lost the contract. What is the likelihood that you would
feel incompetent?
7. A friend tells you that you boast a great deal. What is the likelihood that you would stop
spending time with that friend?
8. Your home is very messy and unexpected guests knock on your door and invite themselves
in. What is the likelihood that you would avoid the guests until they leave?
63
9. You secretly commit a felony. What is the likelihood that you would feel remorse about
breaking the law?
10. You successfully exaggerate your damages in a lawsuit. Months later, your lies are dis-
covered and you are charged with perjury. What is the likelihood that you would think
you are a despicable human being?
11. You strongly defend a point of view in a discussion, and though nobody was aware of it,
you realize that you were wrong. What is the likelihood that this would make you think
more carefully before you speak?
12. You take office supplies home for personal use and are caught by your boss. What is the
likelihood that this would lead you to quit your job?
13. You make a mistake at work and find out a co-worker is blamed for the error. Later, your
co-worker confronts you about your mistake. What is the likelihood that you would feel
like a coward?
14. At a co-worker’s housewarming party, you spill red wine on their new cream-colored carpet.
You cover the stain with a chair so that nobody notices your mess. What is the likelihood
that you would feel that the way you acted was pathetic?
15. While discussing a heated subject with friends, you suddenly realize you are shouting
though nobody seems to notice. What is the likelihood that you would try to act more
considerately toward your friends?
16. You lie to people but they never find out about it. What is the likelihood that you would
feel terrible about the lies you told?
Guilt Negative-Behavior-Evaluation (NBE) 1, 9, 14, 16
Guilt Repair (R) 2, 5, 11, 15
Shame Negative-Self-Evaluation (NSE) 3, 6, 10, 13
Shame Withdraw (W) 4, 7, 8, 12
Table D.1: GASP Questionnaire - Answers Key
PART 2 - Honesty-Humility Scale from the 100-items HEXACO Personality
Inventory - Revised (Lee and Ashton, 2004)
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with these statements about you by using the
following categories: (1) Strongly disagree, (2) Disagree, (3) Neutral (neither agree nor disagree),
(4) Agree, (5) Strongly disagree.
64
1. If I want something from a person I dislike, I will act very nicely toward that person in
order to get it.
2. If I knew that I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal a million dollars.
3. Having a lot of money is not especially important to me.
4. I am an ordinary person who is no better than others are.
5. I would not use flattery to get a raise or promotion at work, even if I thought it would
succeed.
6. I would be tempted to buy stolen property if I were financially tight.
7. I would like to live in a very expensive, high-class neighborhood.
8. I would not want people to treat me as though I were superior to them.
9. If I want something from someone, I will laugh at that person’s worst jokes.
10. I would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large.
11. I would like to be seen driving around in a very expensive car.
12. I think that I am entitled to more respect than the average person is.
13. I would not pretend to like someone just to get that person to do favors for me.
14. I would be tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get away with it.
15. I would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive luxury goods.
16. I want people to know that I am an important person of high status.
Sincerity 1R, 5, 9R, 13
Fairness 2R, 6R, 10, 14R
Greed-Avoidance 3, 7R, 11R, 15R
Modesty 4, 8, 12R, 16R
Table D.2: Honesty-Humility Scale - Answers Key26
PART 3 – Inspired by the Self Report Altruism Scale (Rushton et al., 1981)27
Please indicate the frequency with which you have carried out the following acts by using the
following categories: (1) Never, (2) Once, (3) More than once, (4) Often, (5) Very Often.
27Three items were excluded: “I have made change for a stranger”, “I have given a stranger a lift in
my car” and “I have bought ‘charity” Christmas cards deliberately because I knew it was a good cause”.
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1. I have helped a stranger change a flat tire.28
2. I have given directions to a stranger.
3. I have given money, goods or clothes to a charity.29
4. I have delayed an elevator and held the door open for a stranger.
5. I have donated blood.
6. I have helped carry a stranger’s belongings (books, parcels, etc.).
7. I have allowed someone to go ahead of me in a lineup (at photocopy machine, in the
supermarket).
8. I have pointed out a clerk’s error (in a bank, at the supermarket) in undercharging me for
an item.
9. I have let a neighbor whom I did not know too well borrow an item of some value to me
(e.g., a dish, tools, etc.)
10. I have done volunteer work for a charity.
11. I have helped a classmate who I did not know that well with a homework assignment when
my knowledge was greater than his or hers.
12. I have before being asked, voluntarily looked after a neighbor’s pets or children without
being paid for it.
13. I have offered to help a handicapped or elderly stranger across a street.
14. I have offered my seat on a bus or train to a stranger who was standing.
15. I have helped an acquaintance to move households.
16. I have given money to a stranger who needed it (or asked me for it).
PART 4 – Socio-Demographics
1. Risk Preferences (Dohmen et al., 2011)
How would you describe yourself? Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to
take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale, where the
value ”0” means ”not at all willing to take risks” and the value ”10” means ”very willing
to take risks”.
28Originally: “I have helped push a stranger’s car out of the snow.”
29Originally it was two different items: I have given money to charity” and “I have donated goods or
clothes to a charity”.
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2. Time Preferences (Visher et al., 2013)
How would you describe yourself? Are you generally an impatient person, or someone
who always shows great patience? Please tick a box on the scale, where the value ”0”
means ”very impatient” and the value ”10” means ”very patient”.
3. Religiosity
How would you describe yourself? How often do you pray?
• I never pray
• I seldom pray
• I pray every week
• I pray more than once a day
4. Gender
Please indicate your gender.
• Female
• Male
5. Age
Please indicate your age.
6. Status
Please indicate your status.
• Student
• Employed
• Unemployed
• Retired
(a) School - if your answer to question 6 is “Student”
Which school do you attend?
– EM Lyon
– Ecole Centrale Lyon
– ISOste´o
– Universite´ Lyon 1
– Universite´ Lyon 2
– Universite´ Lyon 3
– Universite´ Catholique de Lyon
– Other
(b) Field of Study - if your answer to question 6 is “Student”
What is your field of study?
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– Economics and Management
– Social Sciences
– Arts and Humanities
– Engineering Sciences
– Medical Studies
– Other
(c) Professional Activity - if your answer to question 6 is “Employed”
What is your current professional status?
– Farmer
– Craftsman, shopkeeper, business owner
– Executive and higher intellectual occupations
– Civil servant, administrative employee
– Employee
– Worker
7. Number of previous experiments
In how many GATE-LAB experimental sessions have you participated already?
8. Personal Login
Please choose a personal login. Choose a login that you can remember easily since you
will need this login to start the experimental session. We suggest you use ”Mother’s or
Father’s first name - her/his day of birth - her/his month of birth” without space or dash.
For example, if your mother is called Brigitte and is born a May 19th, the suggested login
is ”Brigitte1905”.
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